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"Lord Deliver Us From Justice"
Donald R. Kelley
WRITTEN LAW
"The concept of writing should define the field of a science," Jacques
Derrida has said (has written, I mean),' and this has been conspicuously
true for the science of law. In the continental European-that is, the
Roman or Romanoid-tradition, law is conceived asjus scriptum, which
means that in order to have force, to be enacted, law had to be recorded,
and therefore depended in every way on written proof and procedure.2
Human will and human acts are psychological and social phenomena, no
doubt; but in the law "acts" and "wills" are transformed into written
instruments; and in this connection Justice, too, while remaining blind,
has had to learn to write. In the Renaissance, of course, she also had to
learn history, philosophy, and other academic disciplines, and was
thereby initiated into the elitist and politicized world of print culture.3
Yet in a rudimentary way law was the product of custom-jus non
scriptum precededjus scriptum-as both Roman lawyers and their Euro-
pean descendants generally believed. As particular actions underlie
unwritten custom and social rules, so particular judgments underlie legal
rules; and however indirectly, the cumulative record and interpretation
of such rules are the basis for later codifications, systems of law, and
various attempts to improve and to "reform" these formal legal cre-
ations. Such at least is the ideal history on which the professional legal
tradition and its self-image seems to be based.
"Justice is the constant and perpetual desire to render everyone his
1. JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 27 (Gayatri Chakrovorty Spivak trans. 1974).
2. DIG. 1.1.6 (Ulpian): "Hoc igitur ius nostrum constat aut ex scripto out sine scripto." The
distinction is ubiquitous in later commentaries, vernacular and Latin. See generally JACK GOODY,
THE LOGIC OF WRITING AND THE ORGANIZATION OF SOCIETY (1886); BRIAN STOCK, THE
IMPLICATIONS OF LITERACY: WRITTEN LANGUAGE AND MODELS OF INTERPRETATION IN THE
ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CENTURIES (1983); ROSAMOND McKITERCK, THE CAROLINGIANS
AND THE WRITTEN WORD (1989).
3. The following discussion draws on my THE HUMAN MEASURE: SOCIAL THOUGHT IN THE
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1991); Ancient Verses on New Ideav" Legal Tradition and the French
Historical School, 26 HIST. AND THEORY 319 (1987); and especially "Second Nature" The Idea of
Custom in European Law, Society, and Culture, in THE TRANSMISSION OF CULTURE IN EARLY
MODERN EUROPE 131 (Anthony Grafton & Ann Blair eds., 1990).
1
Kelley: "Lord Deliver Us From Justice"
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1993
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
due."4 This is the famous Roman formula heading both the Institutes
and the Digest of Justinian, who represented his great codification as a
temple erected in the honor of Justice.5 Medieval jurists, too, wor-
shipped Justice as a virtual deity, a holy mediator (Justitia Mediatrix)
between natural and positive law.6 The twelfth-century glossator Placen-
tinus pretended to have discovered the temple itself, containing represen-
tations not only of the goddess but also of daughters, including equity
and all the civic virtues. According to the standard etymology, law was
itself derived from-was the "mother" and the "cause" of-justice (jus a
justitia),7 though linguistically it had to be the other way around. Justice
is glorified, too, in the great fresco of Ambrogio Lorenzetti, enthroned
next to Good Government, again surrounded by all the moral and polit-
ical virtues.' And if Justice was a goddess, the jurists were, from classi-
cal times on, her priests (sacerdotes Justitiae), as modem commentators
(including some on the Napoleonic Code) continue to insist.9
This is the view taken by scholars, philosophers, and especially law-
yers. In popular culture, by contrast, Justice has often shown another
face. My purpose here is to suggest some aspects of the other and darker
side of the diptych. In the sixteenth century the legal establishment and
its pretensions to a monopoly over public virtue was the object of almost
as much popular indignation as the Roman church. "Good jurist, bad
Christian" was one famous proverb, (bonusjurista, malus Christus, with
variations in the vernacular languages), repeated by Luther, 0 but there
were secular outcries as well. "God save us from many things," ran one
sixteenth-century adage. "God save us from the et cetera of the nota-
ries." "God save us from the equity of the Parlements."'I In our own
century, according to Eugen Weber, French farmers were still praying,
"Lord, deliver us from all evil and from justice."' 2
Such countercultural protests pointed to more than suspicion and
hatred of lawyers, however. It suggested a larger distrust of the devices
4. J. INST. 1.1.1; DIG. 1.1.10.1; DEO AUCTORE; see generally ADOLPH BERGER, ENCYCLOPEDIC
DICTIONARY OF ROMAN LAW, Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, n.s., XLIII, pt. 2
(1953).
5. CODE J. 1.17.1.5.
6. See ERNST KANTOROWICZ, THE KING'S Two BODIES 113 (1957); HERMANN
KANTOROWICZ, STUDIES IN THE GLOSSATORS OF THE ROMAN LAW 183 (1938).
7. DIG. 1.1.1 (Accursius), and many other glossators and commentators.
8. On the fresco in the Palazzo Publico, Siena, see Quentin Skinner, Ambrogio Lorenzetti: The
Artist as Political Philosopher, 72 PROC. OF THE BRITISH ACADEMY 1 (1986).
9. DIG. 1.1.1; cf J.E.D. BERNARDI, COURS DU DROIT CIVIL 3 (1803).
10. MARTIN LUTHER, Table Talk, in LIV LUTHER'S WORKS 474 (Theodore G. Tappert trans.,
1967); see also R. STINTZLING, DAS SPRICHWORT "JURISTEN B6SE CHRISTEN" (1875); C. Kenny,
Bona Jurista, Mala Christa, 19 L.Q. REv. 326 (1903).
11. "Dieu nous garde de I'equitd des parlements" (16th cent.), in LOCUTIONS LATINS ET ADAGES
DU DROIT FRANgAIS CONTEMPORAIN (Henri Roland & Laurent Boyer eds., 1978) 1.211; "Dieu nous
garde de Pet coetera du notaire" (16th cent.) id. at 1.216.




Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol5/iss1/9
Kelley
and engines of modem "justice." For many modem critics the enemy
was "written law" itself, which in general meant Roman law in its mod-
em incarnations and transmutations. French jurists of the sixteenth cen-
tury traced all their legal and social ills to the infiltrations of civil and
canon law, with their reliance on written procedures, written commenta-
ries, and various forms of "chicanery." 13 In France justice was originally
something to be dispensed not in written acts but in face-to-face commu-
nications, the conventional image here being that of justice dispensed
under the oak tree-not only the famous oak of Vincennes under which
Saint Louis used to hold court but also the oak of Rousseau under which
the People first made their Social Contract. Ultimately, in fact, the con-
flict arose because justice was tied to the idea of popular custom, which
by definition wasjus non scriptum, a phenomenon of oral culture often at
odds with forms of law based exclusively on writing and legislation.
To some extent the contrast between popular usage and official forms
of law is a stereotype fashioned by early modem counterparts of Critical
Legal Studies. Nevertheless, the theme figures prominently in the writ-
ings of professional jurists. On the one hand there was custom, which (as
the fourteenth-century jurist Bartolus put it) "represents the will of the
people" (consuetudo repraesentat mentem populi).'4 In form, custom was
virtually a social compact (consuetudo quasi ex contractu, according to
another famous formula), 5 which theoretically could not only "inter-
pret" and "correct" but even "abolish" written law. 6 On the other hand
there was the authoritarian principle enshrined in Justinian's Digest that
law expressed the will not of the people but only of the prince. "What
pleases the prince has the force of law" (Quod principi placuit, legis habet
vigorem) was the famous formula drawn from the Corpus Juris Civilis.
Thus, starting with Justinian, the only source of law was imperial legisla-
tion (not enactments of the senate, decisions of the jurisconsults, or pop-
ular custom). ' On the one hand there was the immovable body of
popular usages and on the other the irresistible force of legislative will
underlying the modem "sovereign" state-and it was the latter that ulti-
mately (ostensibly) prevailed.
UNWRITTEN LAW
In France the transition to modem ideas of justice was clear. "For a
long time," wrote one seventeenth-century commentator, "the customary
13. DONALD R. KELLEY, THE BEGINNING OF IDEOLOGY: CONSCIOUSNESS AND SOCIETY IN
THE FRENCH REFORMATION 178 (1981); J.V. ALTER, LES ORIGINES DE LA SATIRE ANTI-
BOURGEOISE EN FRANCE 166 (1966).
14. IN PRIMAM FF. [DIGESTI] VETERIS PARTEM COMMENTARIA fol. 16r. (1974).
15. See, e.g., GuY DE COQUILLE, Commentaires sur les coustumes de Niverois, in LES OEUVRES
2 (1646).
16. DIG. 1.3.32 (Accursius).
17. DIG. 1.4.1, on which there is a huge tradition of commentary and later literature.
1993]
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law [of Paris] was observed without being written anywhere except on
the hearts of the citizens who keep it; and if in doubt, the proof lay not in
books but in the assemblies of those who knew the practice and common
usage."'" The proof referred to by this feudist took the form of a royal
inquest (inquisitio, enqufte), in which a group of men (sometimes expert,
usually twelve in number, and almost always elderly) testified to the
existence of certain usages from time immemorial (usually three genera-
tions) and allowed the king's men to produce an official "redaction."' 9
The reformation of customs in the sixteenth century followed a similar
procedure, with the text of the coutumier being rewritten and "regular-
ized" by royal agents with the consent of representatives of the three
estates-the fiction of the "popular" basis of customary law thus being
retained.20 As Montesquieu summed up six centuries of French legal
history, "our customs were written down, they were made more general,
and they received the stamp of royal authority."'" Thus the customs
were modernized, politicized, and absorbed into royal legislation, judge-
made and university-taught law, and learned jurisprudence. Officially, it
would seem, the transformation of custom into law stilled the voice of
the people and locked justice away in a "prison-house" of written
language.
To historians these processes of redaction and reformation are fasci-
nating. The confrontation of actors and legislators, of the subjects and
agents of sovereignty, seems to represent a magic moment in legal his-
tory-the shift from oral to literate culture-and indeed it marks the
closest thing in the historical record to the transition from the state of
nature to that of civil society. Unfortunately, we can follow this transi-
tion from fact to law only through its written remains, and these are
scarce and skimpy. Almost all extant collections of medieval and early
modem customary law are themselves based on records or previous
notes. Even the procds-verbaux of oral discussions are necessarily sec-
ond-hand-not only hearsay, as it were, but hearwrite-which com-
pounds the problem of communication.22 Like the myth that has the
18. GILES FORTIN, CONFERENCE DE LA COUSTUME DE PARIS, AVEC LES AUTRES COUSTUMES
DE FRANCE (1605), EPISTRE. For French customary law see especially the listings in ANDRf
GOURON & ODILE TERRIN, BIBLIOGRAPHIE DES COUTUMES DE FRANCE (1975); JEAN CASWELL
& IVAN SIPKOV, THE CUSTOMS OF FRANCE IN THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (1977).
19. Eg., JACQUES D'ABLEIGES, LE GRAND COUTUMIER DE FRANCE 102 (Louis Le Caron ed.,
1598); JEAN BOUTEILLER, SOMME RURALE 6 (1603). Still valuable is HIPPOLYTE PISSARD, ESSAI
SUR LA CONNAISSANCE ET LA PREUVE DES COUTUMES EN JUSTICE, DANS L'ANCIEN DROIT
FRAN4AIS ET DANS LE SYSrftME ROMANO-CANONIQUE (1910).
20. See especially REN FILHOL, LE PREMIER PR tSIDENT CHRISTOFLE DE THOU ET LA
RltFORMATION DES COUTUMES (1937).
21. CHARLES DE S]CONDAT DE MONTESQUIEU, DE L'ESPRIT DES LOIS 28.45.
22. One useful example is BIBLIOTHtQUE NATIONALE MS FR. 5281, Premier project de la
nouvelle Coustume de Paris; MS 5282, Second project; and MS 5254, Observations by Simon Marion,
spokesman for the Second Estate; see also CHARLES A. BOURDOT DE RICHEBOURG, NOUVEAU
COUTUMIER GENERAL 1. 18, 11.1169, 111.392, etc. (1724). See the further discussion in my Second
Nature, supra note 3.
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earth resting on a turtle, itself resting on another turtle, there is no Ur-
source that gives access to oral culture. As it is turtles all the way down,
so it is written records all the way down; and many of them-the records
I mean-are missing, corrupt, or suspect. Even through the most
advanced historical methods or sensitive literary techniques we cannot
reach into the mind of the people; we cannot recover the state of nature.
Nevertheless, these legal remains do reflect popular assumptions about
the contrast between the simplicity of justice in a natural setting and the
recondite language of the lawyers. In France the discourse of custom,
followed through the great corpus of droit coutumier and the accumu-
lated commentaries first in Latin and then in French, is continuous
across at least five centuries; and the assumptions remain remarkably
constant even as issues and contexts changed. "Twice makes a custom,"
according to a medieval proverb.23 People themselves were living proof
of this custom. And, according to another proverb, "ten makes a peo-
ple."24 In post-redaction society, however, memory and usage were
largely replaced by the written word, compared to which an oral protest
counted for nothing-it "was not valid against a written instrument"
(protestatio non valet contra actum).2  It had long been the case in
Roman law that judicial determinations must be accepted as truth (res
judicata pro veritate accipitur),2 6 but now printed documents came also to
occupy this position of authority. Roman law itself (which was common
law in the provinces of the south) was defined as "written reason" (ratio
scripta, la raison 6crite), a formula that was commonplace by the thir-
teenth century." Moreover, as Charles Dumoulin declared in his great
commentary on the coutume of Paris, "Public documents prove them-
selves" (scripta publica probant se ipsa).28 The reformation of customs-
whose principal theorist was this same Dumoulin--carried the assault on
custom further by subordinating local liberties to the ideal of national
unity. No wonder the three Estates fought over every clause of their
provincial coutumes; no wonder they opposed the idea of a code down to
the bitter end-that is, down to the Revolution.
Of course, customs could be bad as well as good; mala consuetudo was
a label of protest over several centuries. 29 The term was applied not only
to the burdens of taxes and tolls (common meanings of consuetudo) but
also to the sort of abuses that provoked many a peasant uprising between
the twelfth and the eighteenth century. Theoretically, the test of any
23. PIERRE DE FONTAINES, LE CONSEIL A UN AMI 492 (A.J. Marnier ed., 1846).
24. A. ESMEIN, Decem faciunt populum, in MLANGES P.F. GIRARD 457-73.24.2232 (1912).
25. LOCUTIONS LATINES 11.305.
26. DIG. 50.17.207.
27. KELLEY, THE HUMAN MEASURE 121, 149, 186, 232 (1991), supra note 3.
28. COMMENTARII IN PARISIENSIS TOTIUS GALIAE SUPREMI PARLAMENTI CONSUETUDINIS 1.8
(D. Godefroy ed., 1603); cf. C.cIv. 1319. See also LOCUTIONS LATINES 11.472.
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custom was natural law, or reason, for the French feudists, like the Eng-
lish common lawyers, believed that their customs were indeed expres-
sions of natural law. "This custom is proved by thejus naturale," wrote
one sixteenth-century commentator on the coutume of Bourges, "by
which all men are born equal." 30 The legislators of the French Revolu-
tion agreed with this premise, but they also agreed with the judgment of
another old regime jurist that in fact "custom" had come to mean not
natural liberty but only "an expression of the authority of the lord of the
fief and a collection of the rights he had exacted from his vassals."31 The
leaders of the French Revolution opposed their own universalist concep-
tions of liberty and equality against the particularist "liberties" of le droit
coutumier. The upshot in 1789 was the destruction of the whole struc-
ture of customary law and its replacement by an authoritarian Code.32
THE REFORMATION OF JUSTICE
In general, the transition to written law (and perhaps the implicit ideal
of a uniform code) was certainly appealing to those who identified social
improvement with the national State. To many observers-proto-
Jacobins we might almost say-the legal reformers of the sixteenth cen-
tury seemed to be social physicians if not social engineers.3 3 One sup-
porter compared the eloquent justifications of Christofle de Thou,
president of the Parlement of Paris and leader of the reformation move-
ment, to the actions of a skilled surgeon administering a soothing anes-
thetic to a patient before amputating one or more of his or her limbs.
Their enterprise was indeed radical in appearance; and it is significant
that their enterprise was usually referred to as not merely the reforma-
tion of custom or of law but more pretentiously as la Reformation de la
Justice.
Did justice benefit from such modernizing surgery? Members of the
non-noble proprietary class-the bourgeois, or roturier--certainly gained
by the undermining of the feudal courts; and married women, who were
generally regarded as incapable of guarding their own interests, benefit-
ted by being guaranteed disposition of the property they brought into the
nuptial union. In these and other ways royal justice tended to put an end
to various abuses, prejudices, usurpations, and dispossessions inherited
from immemorial custom, and to offer protection to the so-called "poor
subjects" (pauvre sujets) excluded from feudal or churchly privilege.
In France, as elsewhere in Europe, property in one sense or another
30. NICOLAS BOHIER, CONSUETUDINES BITURICENSES f.1 (1543).
31. RENtE DE LA BIGOTIERRE, avertissement, COMMENTAIRES SUR LA COUTUME DE
BRETAGNE (1702).
32. DONALD R. KELLEY, HISTORIANS AND THE LAW IN POSTREVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 41
(1984).
33. For what follows, see especially FILHOL, supra note 20.
[Vol. 5:159
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was a central question, and here again the written word became decisive,
especially through what we might call the quo warranto principle. No
land without a lord (nulle terre sans seigneur) was the customary
maxim;34 but how, in literate culture, could one prove lordship if not by
writing? The peasantry was especially vulnerable to the encroachments
and usurpations over customary holdings and rights, but under condi-
tions of that fearful oxymoron of written custom all interested parties
were vulnerable. In the redaction of the coutume of Troyes in 1493, for
example, the nobility argued that there was no such thing as a free allod
(franc-alleu), while the Third Estate took their stand on the contrary
maxim that "every inheritance is free if not shown [by title] to be held in
fief."" The nobles objected that they would lose many of their custom-
ary rights thereby, for "they were not accustomed," they said, "to pre-
pare a title or written obligation but only to write it down in the
seigneurial records, and this would not serve as written proof."
Again, the reformation of provincial customs reinforced this march
toward modernization--or, as sixteenth-century critics like Rabelais and
Hotman saw it, descent into "chicanery." In the reformation of the cou-
tume of Amiens in 1567 the local Vidame complained that the alterations
would deprive him of territories held by "immemorial possession.",36
Under such circumstances the only one to gain was the king, or rather
the sovereign court of the Parlement of Paris, the first president of which,
Christofle de Thou, was also the leader of the Reformation movement.
The people were no longer consulted about their "liberties," and indeed a
sixteenth-century act officially "prohibited any of the advocates of the
realm from alleging or proposing other customs, usages, and styles
except those written down, agreed upon, and ordered."37  Not that the
state itself scrupled to employ custom for its own benefit, for it was on
the basis of the maxim Nulle terre sans seigneur that Louis XIV issued
his edict of 1667, which confiscated all allodial land being held without
written title.
THE SURVIVAL OF CUSTOM
The force of custom was not completely removed from the body politic
by the legal surgeons. It survived not only in ancient maxims but also in
the memories of judges; and at least in theory custom continued often to
be celebrated (in the old juridical maxims) as the "best interpreter,"
"corrector," and even "abrogator" of law.38 In some circumstances cus-
34. ANTOINE LOISEL, INSTITUTES COUSTUMIfRES 43 (2.2.214) (1611).
35. BOURDOT DE RICHEBOURG, supra note 22, at III(1), 289.
36. FILHOL, supra note 20, at 92 and passim.
37. RECUEIL GtNtRAL DES ANCIENNES LOIS FRANgAISES IX, 253 (F. Isambert et al. eds., 1821-
33).
38. DIG. 1.3.37, and many commentaries and "extensions"; e.g., "Et quidem videtur quod
1993]
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tom even became a revolutionary force. From the thirteenth to the eight-
eenth century, peasant uprisings were defended on the grounds of custom
and its violation by unjust laws (another not uncommon oxymoron). In
the rebellions of seventeenth-century France, as Roland Mousnier has
shown, outrage was directed not against custom but against practices
that were newly instituted by lawyers.3 9
Custom could produce litigation as well as violence, of course. In the
later seventeenth century, for example, some Burgundian peasants sued
their lords in the attempt to eliminate abuses which were not in accord
with the more general custom of French provinces. 4 In the courts of
Louis XIV, moreover, custom was unofficially reinforced by a new way
of invoking unwritten law, that is, the concept of the "spirit of customary
law" (esprit du droit coutumier)4 -a concept identified not with the
"spirit of the law" in Montesquieu's sense but with the spirit of the peo-
ple, the Volksgeist as German scholars called it, which was to say, in
1789, the sovereign nation.
The revolutionary potential of custom was still more evident in the
peasant uprisings in Reformation Germany, which were aimed at the
intrusions of the newly received written law and more generally against
anything foreign, novel, or uncustomary (ungebrauchlich)4 This atti-
tude was in keeping, too, with Lutheran opposition to canon law and the
threats of secular learning. Although Luther himself did not hesitate to
exploit the printed book, he thought that true faith was basically a matter
of hearing the word (fides ex auditu) and that writing was all too often a
source of the corruption of spiritual truth.43 The righteousness of God
was a whole world and a heaven apart from what Luther condemned as
"the law," meaning Judaic as well as canon law-and I hope I need not
remind you that this righteousness in its original form was really the
"justice of God" (fustitia Dei).
In less conspicuous ways, too, custom lived on in the spirit of the peo-
ple as well as in the rhetoric and memory of the jurists. Like the profes-
sion of law itself, written law continued, in many quarters, to be regarded
with suspicion and hostility. Over many centuries, critics who preferred
the Germanic tradition of custom to the Roman tradition of written law
denounced the tyrannical and acquisitive character of Justinian's code.
Such was the view of Frangois Hotman and many other anti-Romanists
consuetudo sit conditrix legi et abrogatrix, et interpretatrix," in Azo, IN JUS CIVILE SUMMA f.233v
(1564).
39. ROLAND MOUSNIER, PEASANT UPRISINGS (Brian Pearce trans., 1970).
40. HILTON ROOT, PEASANT AND KING IN BURGUNDY: AGRARIAN FOUNDATIONS OF
FRENCH ABSOLUTISM 188 (1987).
41. PIERRE GROSELY, RECHERCHES POUR SERVIR A L'HISTOIRE DU DROIT FRANgOIS 122
(1752).
42. See GERALD STRAUSS, LAW, RESISTANCE, AND THE STATE: THE OPPOSITION TO ROMAN
LAW IN REFORMATION GERMANY 100 (1986).
43. KELLEY, supra note 13, at 103 and passim.
[Vol. 5:159
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in the sixteenth century, and such was the view of Heinrich Heine in the
nineteenth century. "What an awful book the Corpus Juris is," Heine
wrote, "this Bible of selfishness."'
By the time of Heine, the Romanist evil was best illustrated in the
institution of private property, directly imported from the Code of Jus-
tinian into that of his epigone Napoleon. Indeed property rights became
its primary theme.45 The contemporary assault on this aspect of written
law was mounted by nineteenth-century socialists like P.-J. Proudhon,
whose mission was to resolve the central paradox of society, which was
the disparity between possession and property." Property was, of
course, a matter of written title, while possession was an amphibious con-
cept that included both fact and law-both the realities of economic
activity and the legalities of document and proof. For Proudhon, who
often invoked the autonomy of unwritten custom, possession was the nat-
ural condition of human life, while property, which was bound to written
instruments and mercenary lawyers, was nothing less than "theft." Even
though free from writing, possession still represents, proverbially and
perhaps morally, "nine points of the law." Whatever the merits of Prou-
dhon's argument in seeking what Paolo Grossi calls "another kind of
property" (an altro modo di possidere),47 the point is that possession,
linked both to the ancient law of saisine and to modem ideals of social
justice, represents a significant survival of the ancient regime of popular
custom.
The passage of time did not weaken popular opposition to the
processes of modernization and literalization. As Eugen Weber has
argued, it was not until our own century that the forces of modernity
finally turned "peasants into Frenchmen."48 In principle (or at least in
popular opinion) custom continued to represent a source of justice
beyond the letter of the law. It was grounded on a sort of sociological
jurisprudence that required legal rules to conform to the character of a
particular society and, like equity, it took into account particular condi-
tions of persons as well as places. In extreme cases custom might even
justify resistance to laws which, though "on the books," had become
inequitable or outmoded (the old concept of desuetudo, the opposite of
consuetudo).49 In this context the authority of custom could also be
enhanced by modern natural law, which likewise represented a "higher,"
unwritten limitation on written, "positive" law.
44. Cited in MAX BROD, HEINE 77 (1956).
45. See KELLEY, supra note 32, at 127 and passim.
46. See the introduction to P.-J. PROUDHON, WHAT IS PROPERTY? (D.R. Kelley & Bonnie
Smith trans., forthcoming 1993).
47. Grossi's book of this title has been translated by Lydia Cochrane as AN ALTERNATIVE TO
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1981).
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This is not the place even to begin tracing the fortunes of the modem
concept of custom and the "unwritten law" in their relationship to jus-
tice. Suffice it to say that in the nineteenth century the idea of custom,
though for a time central to the new sciences of society, especially
anthropology and sociology, seems to have become marginal in modem
legal traditions. Jacobins, Bonapartists, Utilitarians, and Austinians all
looked to legislation as the true science of law and society, and even in
the historical and sociological schools of law, "custom" was a matter of
legal convention or judicial determination. It was left for the most part
to the social and cultural historians to read the mind of the "people"-
and in their own way to reduce it to writing.
In The Greek Concept of Justice, Eric Havelock traces justice from
what he calls its oral "shadow" in Homer to its literate "substance" in
Plato, and represents it finally as a "philosophy of the written word."5°
This seems to accord, too, with the medieval and early modem European
experience, which progressed (in M. T. Clanchy's words) "from memory
to written record."51 Another of Havelock's studies of the transition
from orality to literacy is entitled The Muse Learns to Write.52 Well,
Justice, too, while remaining blind, has had to "learn to write"-and
indeed, since the Renaissance, to adapt to the public world of print cul-
ture and literacy. In this process the voice of the people represented by
custom has been muted, if not silenced. Justice writes, and those seeking
justice must learn to read and write; that is, they must rise to a level of
cultural skill demanded by modem legal systems. Therein lies an abun-
dance of inequities, or so History (whose muse also writes) seems to sug-
gest. A final and more up-to-date conclusion about this paradox of
western civilization I leave to scholars, judges, advocates, and witnesses
more expert than myself.
50. ERIC HAVELOCK, THE GREEK CONCEPT OF JUSTICE: FROM ITS SHADOW IN HOMER TO
ITS SUBSTANCE IN PLATO 324 (1978).
51. M.T. CLANCHY, FROM MEMORY TO WRITTEN RECORD: ENGLAND 1066-1307 (1979).
52. ERIC HAVELOCK, THE MUSE LEARNS TO WRITE: REFLECTIONS ON ORALITY AND
LITERACY FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT (1986).
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